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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,)
)

-vs-

)

Case No. 15169

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY,

)
)

Defendant and Appellant. )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Respondent,
Kennecott Copper Cdrporation,

(hereinafter referred to

as "Kennecott"), against Defendant-Appellant, Salt Lake
County,

(hereinafter referred to as "the County"), to

recover those general ad valorem property taxes paid to
the County by Kennecott under protest for tax year
1976.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Kennecott filed an alternative Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment with regard to
its First Cause of Action.
The County filed an alternative Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment with regard to
Kennecott's First and Second Causes of Action.

The
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Trial Court denied the County's Motions and took Kennecott's alternative Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
or for Summary Judgment under advisement.

Kennecott

and the County submitted to the Trial Court legal
The Trial Court thereafter issued its

memoranda.

Memorandum Decision granting Kennecott a Partial Summary
Judgment.

The Trial Court ruled that the County, under

the facts as presented, was without legal authority to
reset its mill levy after that date prescribed by
statute.

In denying the County's Motion, the Trial

Court also ruled that this Court's decision in Salt Lake
City Corporation et al. v. Salt Lake County, Case
No. 14776 decided October 7, 1977, an original action
filed in this Court in which Kennecott was a petitioner
and the County a defendant, was not res judicata upon
this action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The County seeks reversal of the judgment of the
Trial Court.

Kennecott seeks to have this Court sustain

the Trial Court's partial summary judgment as against
the County.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 9, 1976, the County Board of Commissioners
set the general Salt Lake County property tax mill levy
at 14.42 mills.

(Record 2-3,20).
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On September 20, 1976, the County Board of Commissioners attempted to reset that mill levy of August 9,
1976 from 14.42 mills to 16 mills.

(Record 3,20).

On November 30, 1976 Kennecott paid the County
those taxes assessed against Kennecott's real and personal
taxable property for the tax year 1976.

(Record 2-3,20).

Concurrently with the payment on November 30, 1976 by
Kennecott to the County, Kennecott also submitted to
appropriate officials of the County a letter protesting
the payment of certain portions of the general Salt Lake
County property tax assessment levied against Kennecott
for tax year 1976.

(Record 3, 8-11, 20).

In said

letter of protest Kennecott specifically protested Three
Hundred Ten Thousand Fifty-Two Dollars and Sixty-Eight
Cents ($310,052.68) of that amount paid to Salt Lake
County for taxes during tax year 1976.

(Record 8).

This amount paid under protest represented 1.58 mills of
the mill levy assessed against Kennecott by the County
pursuant to the general Salt Lake County property tax.
Kennecott took the position in said protest letter that
1.58 mills of the 16 mill general Salt Lake County
property tax levied by Salt Lake County on September 20,
1976 was illegal, having been attempted to be effectuated
by the County following that date when Utah statutes require
the County to set its general property tax mill levy.
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(Record 8).

Thereafter, on December 7, 1976 Kennecott

filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County a Complaint against the County seeking refund of
the amount paid under protest.

(Record 2-6) .

The County thereafter filed an Answer admitting the
allegations of Paragraph 8 of the Complaint.
Paragraph 8 of Kennecott's Complaint alleges as
follows:
On September 20, 1976 the Salt Lake
County Board of County Commissioners
attempted to reset the 1976 Salt Lake
County General Property Tax mill levy
to 16 mills from that adopted on
August 9, 1976 of 14.42 mills.
(Record 3).
The County admitted the allegations of Kennecott in
Paragraph 8 of the Complaint as follows:
Answering Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's
Complaint, Defendant admits that it
did reset the 1976 General Salt Lake
County Property Tax mill levy at
16 mills on September 20, 1976, but
denies each and every further allegation contained therein.
(Record 20) .
Based upon the County's foregoing admission,
Kennecott moved the Trial Court, on February 3, 1977,
for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment.

(Record 25-28).

On February 17, 1977, the County moved the Trial
Court for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment.

(Record 33-37).

The County's

Motion stated in part:
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The general thrust of Plaintiff's
entire Complaint, including Plaintiff's
First and Second Cause of Action and
Plaintiff's prayer for relief is the
same or substantially similar to the
allegations and relief made and sought
by the Plaintiff, Kennecott Copper
Corporation, in its Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
2. Attached to this pleading is a
certified copy of the Court's decision
in Case No. 14776 in which Kennecott
Copper Corporation, the Plaintiff
herein, was one of the Petitioners.
In that Court's opin~on, the identical
issues presented by Plaintiff's
Complaint in the instant action were
passed upon and the Court in that case
denied the Petition for Relief.
Defendant asserts that the decision of
the Utah Supreme Court in that case is
binding upon Plaintiff in the instant
action and the issues raised in that
case are the same issues as are
presently before this Court and have
already been adjudicated by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah and are
therefore res judicata as against the
Plaintiff.
(Record 36).
On March 1, 1977, the Trial Court heard argument
from both parties with respect to Kennecott's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment, and
the County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or
for Summary Judgment.

(Record 30,31).

At that time

the Trial Court denied the County's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings or in the Alternative Summary Judgment
and took Kennecott's Motion under advisement.

There-

after, both Kennecott and the County submitted legal
memoranda to the Trial Court with respect to Kennecott's
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Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative Summary Judgment.

(Record 50-62 and 63-72).

On April 4, 1977, the Trial Court issued a Memorandum Decision in which it granted Kennecott's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

(Record 73-76).

In the Trial

Court's Memorandum Decision, Judge Conder reasoned and
found as follows:
In this case the Court finds that Salt
Lake County, on August 9, 1976, set the
mill levy for taxation at 14.42 mills.
Thereafter, on September 20, 1976, the
County by a new resolution changed the
mill levy to 16 mills.
The issue to be decided by the Court is
whether or not the imposition of a mill
levy of 16 mills, voted upon by the Salt
Lake County Commission September 20,
1976, is lawful.
Utah Code Annotated §59-9-6.3 requires the
Board of County Commissioners of each
county in the State of Utah levying an
ad valorem property tax to fix the mill
levy between the dates of the last
Monday of July of each year, and the
second Monday of August of each year.
The applicable provision of §59-9-6.3
reads as follows:
'The Board of County Commissioners of
each county must levy a tax on the
taxable property of the county between
the last Monday in the seventh month of
each fiscal year, and the second Monday
in the eighth month of each fiscal year,
to provide funds for County purposes
I

The provision of §17-36-1 of the Utah Code
Annotated also Provides:
'On or before the second Monday in
August of each year, the governing body
shall levy a tax on the taxable real and
personal property in the County . . .
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In addition to the sections already
cited, the Court calls attention to §599-8 which provides for:
'The governing body of each city and
town, and the said Board of County
Commissioners, must file a statement
with the State Tax Commission, on or
before the second Monday in August of
each year, showing the amount and the
purpose of each levy fixed by such
governing body and board.'
The Court finds that the words 'must'
and 'shall' as set forth in the 59-9-6.3
and 17-36-1 are mandatory and not merely
directory. Black's Law Dictionary in
referring to the word 'must' says:
'This word, like the word 'shall' is
primarily a mandatory affect. •
An examination of the same word in

'Words and Phrases' shows that generally
speaking the use of the word 'must' is
mandatory, not merely directory.
In view of the provisions of §59-9-8 it
seems that the Utah ~egislature has consistently held to the levy being fixed
by the second Monday in August of each
year. That provision has been in the
Code since the laws of 1923. Section
59-9-6.3 was added to the law in 1961,
and merely carries out the Legislative
intent.
Defendants refer the Court to 59-11-7
which reads:
'No assessment, or act relating to
assessment, or collection of taxes, is
illegal on account of informality or
because the same was not completed
within the time required by law.'
The Court finds that there is a distinction between the assessment and
the levy of the tax. McQuillen on
Municipal Corporations, §44.92 states:
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'Levy and assessment are distinct
processes, and, except where otherwise
provided by Statute, both are essential
to taxation.'
The Code citation above referred to
relates to the 'assessment', whereas the
first citations refer to the 'levy' of
the tax.
McQuillen on Municipal Corporations,
Section 44.93 says:
'Whatever preliminaries are by law made essential
and mandatory, as distinguished from
directory merely, to the levy of a
tax, mu~t be observed or the tax will
be void.'
The same authority at Section 44.95
states as follows: 'The time for making
the levy is, in most jurisdictions, prescribed by statute or charter. Unless
such provision is directory merely, the
taxing authorities may not disregard a
definite provision as to the time for the
making of the levy, or as to when the
amount of the tax is to be determined and
certified. Generally, only one levy a year
is authorized for the same purpose; but
where no time is fixed for the levy the
ordinance may be passed at any time
within the year.'
'The applicable law governs as to the
effective date of a levy, and as to the
period covered thereby.
It has been
held that a municipality is authorized
to levy taxes in anticipation of demands
that will arise in the future.
A levy
of taxes by a city during the year of
its incorporation generally is authorized.'
The Court recognizes the general rule on
statutory construction of revenue legislation as set forth in Sutherland on
Statutes and Statutory Construction,
1
Section 6701. General Rule.
While the
power to tax, and the exercise of that
power is indispensable to the effective
operation of government, the rule has
become firmly established that tax laws
are to be strictly construed against the
state and in favor of the taxpayer.
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Therefore, where there is reasonable
doubt as to the meaning of a revenue
statute it should be resolved in favor
of those taxed.'
For the foregoing reasons the Court
grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and directs the Plaintiff to
prepare an appropriate Order.
Partial Summary Judgment was entered by the Trial
Court on April 14, 1977.

(Record 77-80).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE
COUNTY'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN CASE NO.
14776 IS NOT RES JUDICATA WITH RESPECT
TO THIS CASE.
In Point I of its brief the County asserts that the
decision of this Court in Case No. 14776 is res judicata
with respect to this appeal.

A careful examination of

Case No. 14776, Salt Lake City Corporation v. Salt Lake
County, and of this case, as well as pertinent authority
with respect to the doctrine of res judicata, reveals
this position to be clearly erroneous.
Salt Lake City Corporation v. Salt Lake County,
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 14776, was an original
action by Kennecott and others in this Court seeking
from this Court an extraordinary writ prohibiting the
County from assessing, collecting or proceeding to
assess and collect 1.58 mills of the general Salt Lake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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County property tax mill levy.

In that case this Court

denied Kennecott and the other petitioners an extraordinary writ.

This Court did not issue an opinion

setting forth the grounds for the denial of that petition.
Rather, denial of the petition for an extraordinary writ
in Case No. 14776 was accomplished by this Court via a
minute entry which reads in full as follows:
Minute Entry - Case No. 14776, Salt Lake
City Corp. v. Salt Lake County
The petition for an extraordinary writ
praying that respondents be: 1) prohibited
from furnishing the services mentioned in
section 17-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, until the provisions of that
section having to do with a) taxing the
property or b) charging a fee for such
services, payable by persons benefited
thereby in unincorporated areas, and should
be prohibited for the reason that an increase
in the mill tax levy was illegal as being ··
statutorily (section 59-9-6.3, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended) untimely
and too late, is denied, and also it is
ordered that any of the justices may make
further or individual explanations in
written opinions to be filed with the
entry of this order or thereafter, by way
of addenda thereto.
Mr. Chief Justice Henroid dissented from
such denial on the grounds it appears that
such denial is:
1) contrary to this Court's
decision in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake
County, 550 P.2d 1291, 1976, Case No. 14304,
justifying the latter's reversal; and
2) is a departure from the clear wording
of section 17-31-4, (suyra.)
(amounting
to judicial legislation ; and 3) sanctions
county commissions to ignore the section
by using general fund monies for an unauthorized purpose; and 4) there are no
facts, and no precedent of this court, and
no dispositive authority cited to justify
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its conclusion that the existing mandatory
statutory requirement that the tax levy
"must" be accomplished on or before a
stated date, can be construed to be a
directory "may be accomplished interdiction."
Mr. Justice Crockett votes to deny the
petition for these reasons:
that the
Court has always been reluctant to interfere with discretionary functions of
other departments, including legislative
and administrative bodies such as the
County Commission, and will do so only
under exigent circumstances; that the
responsibility of setting the tax levy
is reposed in the County Commission and
generally the correction of inadvertances
or errors herein is also within the
Commission's prerogative; and this Court
is asked to act in a great hurry to pass
upon this controversy without a plenary
basis for making such an adjudication.
An examination of the filings submitted in Salt Lake
City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, Utah.Supreme Court Case
No. 14776, reveals that the above cited decision denying
Kennecott and the other petitioners' petition and motion
for an extraordinary writ may have been upon a number of
grounds other than the merits of the case.

Those

grounds are as follows:
1.

Kennecott and the other petitioners in Case No.

14776 had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law and
were therefore, as per terms of Rule 65(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, not entitled to an extraordinary
writ prohibiting Salt Lake County from collecting 1.58
mills of the purported general property tax mill levy.
2.

Utah Code Annotated §59-11-11, 1953 as amended,

providing for the payment under protest of taxes and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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suit for recovery thereafter, provides the exclusive
method under Utah law for prohibiting taxing authority
from collecting illegal taxes.
3.

Utah Code Annotated §59-11-10, 1953 as amended,

prohibits the courts of the State of Utah from enjoining
the collection of any tax.
4.

The action for an extraordinary writ by Kennecott

and other petitioners in Case No. 14776 was not properly
before the court in light of an appeal then pending
before the Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City, et al v.
Salt Lake County, Third Judicial District Civil No.
214675.
See the County's Motion in Opposition to Petitioner's
Petition and Motion for an Extraordinary Writ in Salt Lake
City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, Utah Supreme Court Case
No. 14776, filed with this Court on October 1, 1976.
In order for a judgment and/or decision in one case
to have res judicata effect upon a subsequent action,
the judgment and/or decision in the earlier case must
have been on the merits.

See 50 CJS Judgments, §627 at

p.51; 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §§477-478 at pp.640-643;
and 21 ALR.3d, Judgment Granting or Denying Writ of
Mandamus or Prohibition as Res Judicata, §2 at p.213.
Whenever there is doubt as to whether or not a decision
in one case is a decision on the merits so as to have
res judicata effect upon a subsequent action, the first
decision cannot be considered to have been on the merits.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This rule is well stated in 21 ALR.3d, Judgment Granting
or Denying a Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition as Res
Judicata, §12 at page 248 as follows:
In a number of cases the courts
have held or recognized the rule
to the effect that a judgment
denying a writ of mandamus without
written opinion is not res judicata
unless the sole possible ground of
the denial was that the court acted
on the merits or unless it affirmatively appears that such denial
was intended to be on the merits.
Again, at 21 ALR.3d, Judgment Granting or Denying a Writ
of Mandamus or Prohibition as Res Judicata, §18 at p.
256, it is stated as follows:
In a number of cases the courts have held
or recognized the rule to the effect that
a judgment denying a writ of prohibition
without written opinion is not res judicata
unless the sole possible ground of the
denial was that the court acted on the
merits or unless it affirmatively appears
that such denial was intended to be on
the merits.
The above stated rule has been distinctly and succinctly
stated by a California Court of Appeals in Stearns v. Los
Angeles City School District, 244 Cal.App.2d 696, 53
Cal.Rptr. 482, 21 ALR.3d 164 (1966) as follows:
The last action dictates that
preliminary inquiry be directed to the
question of whether the denial of the
petition for a writ of prohibition is
res judicata of the issues presented
therein, and thereby precludes further
consideration of the question which the
districts seek to have reviewed herein.
The subject was recently reviewed by
this Court with the following conclusion:
'Accordingly, the rule is well settled
that a denial by the Supreme Court or
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the Appellate Court of an application for
a writ without opinion, is not res judicata
of the legal issues presented by the application unless the sole possible ground of
the denial was that the court acted on
the merits, or unless it affirmatively
appears that such denial was intended to
be on the merits.
[citations deleted]
Respondents seek to come within the
'sole possible ground' emphasized in the
foregoing quotation. Examination of the
cases cited reflects no situation where
the exception was applied.
In McDonough
v. Garrison, where the emphasized words
first occur, the following appears:
'At the threshhold of this appeal we are
met by the contention that, inasmuch as
the precise jurisdictional points now
urged for a reversal of the judgment were
urged on the unsuccessful petitions for
prohibition, and inasmuch as the only
points briefed on those procedings were
the jurisdictional questions, denials of
such petitions must have been on the
merits, and therefore such denials
without opinion are res judicata and
constitute binding determinations that
the trial court had jurisdiction to
proceed as it did.' [citations deleted]
The majority opinion, which withstood a
petition for hearing in the Supreme
Court, rejected the view, expressed in
the dissent, that the prior denial of a
writ by the District Court of Appeal,
and denials of rehearing of that ruling,
and of an original application for a
writ by the Supreme Court, were res
judicata of the issue presented.
It
stated the rule as set forth in the
above quotation and found two reasons
why the petition might have been denied
which are also pertinent here: First,
'the various writs could have been
denied because the courts involved felt
that, although there was an apparent
excess of jurisdiction, an appeal from
the final judgment was a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy.
It is elementary
law that even though a trial court is
acting in excess of its ~urisdiction,
an Appellate Court may, in its discretion,
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refuse to interfere by prohibition if
the same questions may be passed on by
an appeal after judgment, and if, in the
opinion of the Appellate Court such
remed is lain, seedy and ade uate.'
citation deleted]; and, secondly, 'the
lower court had ordered a trial de nova
before a jury. That order was not
final.
It was no more final than an
order on a demurrer prior to entry of
judgment is final.
The trial court
could have changed its order at any time
before trial. When the petitions for
writs of prohibition were filed the
appellate courts may have denied them
because they felt that the trial court
would correct its error and not enter a
final order in excess of its jurisdiction.
The possibility that this may have been
the basis of the denials prohibits such
denials from becoming res judicata on the
merits.' [citations deleted].
Id., 21 ALR.3d 164, 172-74.
[Emphasis
added]. See also Collins v. City and
County of"San"""Francisco, 112 Cal.App.2d
719, 247 P.2d 362, 365-366, (1952);
McDonough v. Garrison, 68 Cal.App.2d
318, 156 P.2d 983, 987-89 (1945); Kaufman
v. Pima Junior College, 16 Ariz.App. 152,
492 P.2d 32, 34-35 (1971); Griffith v.
Stout Remodeling, Inc., 219 Kan. 408,
548 P.2d 1238, 1243-44 (1976); and
Hagan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 57 Cal.2d 797, 22 Cal.Rptr. 206,
371 P.2d 982, 984 (1962).
The decision of this court in Salt Lake City Corp.
et al v. Salt Lake County, Case No. 14776, does not
affirmatively appear to be on the merits.

Additionally,

the sole possible ground of that decision,

(Salt Lake City

Corp. et al v. Salt Lake County, Utah Supreme Court Case
No. 14776), as has been pointed out, supra, is not the
merits of whether or not Salt Lake County may enact a
taxing statute after the statutory deadline and have
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such be effective.

Therefore, clearly, according to the

authorities above-cited, that case is not res judicata
upon this action and the trial court was correct in its
denial of the County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
or for Summary Judgment.

POINT II
THE COUNTY IS REQUIRED TO SET ITS MILL
LEVY BY THE SECOND MONDAY IN AUGUST OF
EACH YEAR AND THE TRIAL COURT WAS
CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE SETTING BY
THE COUNTY ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1976 WAS
UNLAWFUL.
In its Memorandum Decision granting Kennecott
partial summary judgment, the Trial Court found as
follows:
In this case the court finds that Salt
Lake County, on August 9, 1976, set the
mill levy for taxation at 14.42 mills.
Thereafter, on September 20, 1976, the
county by a new resolution changed the
mill levy to 16 mills.
This finding is based upon the admissions by the County
in its Answer.
Utah statutes require the County to set its mill
levy by the second Monday in August of each year.

The

Utah Legislature has in three separate statutory provisions stated and reiterated this requirement.

Those

statutory provisons read in pertinent part as follows:
The Board of County Commissioners of
each county must levy a tax on the
taxable property of the county between
the last Monday in the seventh month of
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each fiscal year and the second Monday
in the eighth month of each fiscal year
Utah Code Annotated, §59-9-6.3, 1953
as amended, [Emphasis added].
On or before the second Monday in August
of each year, the governing body shall
levy a tax on the taxable real and~~
personal property within the county.
Utah Code Annotated, §17-36-31, 1953 as
amended, [Emphasis added].
The governing body of each city and
town, and each Board of County Commissioners, must file a statement with
the State Tax Commission, on or before
the second Monday in August of each
year, showing the amount and purpose of
each levy fixed by such governing body
and Board.
Utah Code Annotated, §59-9-8, 1953 as
amended, [Emphasis added].
There is no question that the county possesses no
power to levy any tax outside that conferred upon it by
the Utah Legislature.

This rule has been well stated by

one authority as follows:
The taxing power of the state is exclusively a legislative function, and
taxes can be imposed only in pursuance
of legislative authority, although the
general charge, control, and conduct of
taxation are an executive function.
In
other words, the power to tax must be
drawn from express statutory authority,
there being no such thing as taxation
by implication, and the legislative
authority must be positive and not
negative in nature. All doubts will be
resolved against the taxing power • • • •
The Legislature alone has the right and
discretion to determine all questions of
time, method, nature, purpose and extent in
respect of the imposition of taxes, subjects
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on which the power may be exercised,
and all the incidents pertaining to taxation from beginning to end . . . .
84 CJS Taxation, §7, pp 51-56, [Emphasis
added] . See also Certain Lots Upon Which
Taxes arel5elinquent v. Monticello,
159 Fla. 134, 31 So.2d 905, 909 (1947).
This above-stated rule has been forcefully explicated by the Washington Supreme Court in State ex rel
Tacoma School District v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P.2d
638, 639 (1934)

I

as

fOllOWS!

It is elementary that the power of taxation, subject to constitutional limitations,
rests solely in the legislature. Municipal
corporations have no inherent power to levy
taxes. Their powers are derived through
legislative grant, and are strictly construed.
No implications are indulged in to expand the
powers granted.
[Emphasis added] .
In summary, the County has no inherent power to
tax; its power is derived solely from those legislative
grants given it by the Utah Legislature.

Therefore, the

levying of any tax by the County must be accomplished in
conformity with the relevant state statutes.
The Utah Legislature has declared that the County
must and shall set its tax levy by the second Monday in
August of each year.

See Utah Code Annotated §§59-9-6.3,

59-9-8, and 17-36-31, supra.

The use of these words,

"must" and "shall," in the relevant statutory provisions
impose upon the County a mandatory duty to set its tax
levy by the second Monday in August.

This construction

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
-18-

of the words "must" and "shall" as being mandatory has
been stated by one court as follows:
The word 'mandatory' has been used
synonomously with 'indispensable'
[Citation deleted] . A mandatory provision is one the omission to follow
which renders the proceeding to which
it relates illegal and void, while
a directory provision is one the
observance of which is not necessary
to the validity of the proceedings.
[Citation deleted] .
Whether a statute is mandatory or
directory does not depend upon its
form, but upon the intention of the
Legislature, to be ascertained from
a consideration of the entire act its nature, its character, its
reason, its object, and its subject
matter, as well as the language used.
[Citation deleted] .
But the use of the word, 'shall', is
usually interpreted to make the provision in which it is contained mandator , es eciall if it is fre uentl
repeated.
Citation deleted .
The court continued:
[Shall] is defined as follows:
In common, or ordinary parlance,
and in its ordinary signification,
the term 'shall' is a word of
command, and one which has always,
or which must be given a compulsory
meaning; as denoting obligation.
It has a preemptory meaning, and it
is generally imperative or mandatory.
It has the invariable significance
of excluding the idea of discretio~,
and has the significance of operating
to impose a duty which may be enforced,
Woodmansee v. Cockerill, 174 Ohio St. 11,
185 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ohio App. 1961).
[Emphasis added]
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This Court has, on numerous occasions, recognized
that the terms "shall" and "must" as utilized in statutes
impose a mandatory duty.

See State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah

2d 45, 48, 347 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1960), wherein this
Court held that the use of the term "shall" in a criminal
statute made compliance with the statute mandatory; and
Glenn v. Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P.2d 380 (1956) in
which this Court held the use of the word "must" to impose
a mandatory duty.
This Court has explicitly recognized that use of the
words "shall" and "must" in a statute impose upon relevant
authority mandatory duties.

In Cottonwood City Electors v.

Salt Lake County, 28 Utah 2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972)
this Court, in ruling that a

~articular

statute did not

impose a mandatory duty, stated:
It seems to us that if the Legislature
had intended that the County Commission
should have no discretion, . • . it
could have simply [used the words)
'shall' or 'must' • • •
Id., 28 Utah 2d at 123, 499 P.2d at
272.
It is thus patently clear that use by the Utah
Legislature of the terms "shall" and "must" in those
statutes pertaining to the date upon which the County
must set its mill levy imposes upon the County a mandatory
duty to set said mill levy by that date so stated.
That the terms "shall" and "must" are required to
be construed as imposing a mandatory duty upon the
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county when imposing taxes becomes even more clear in
light of the rule that taxing statutes are to be strictly
construed against the taxing authority and in favor of
the taxpayer.

This rule was succinctly stated by the

United States Supreme Court in Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S.
151, 153, 62 L.Ed. 211, 213, 38 s.ct. 53 (1917) as
follows:
In the interpretation of statutes
levying taxes it is the established
rule not to extend their provisions, by
implication, beyond the clear import of
the language used, or to enlarge their
operations so as to embrace matters not
specifically pointed out.
In case of
doubt they are construed most strongly
against the government, and in favor of
the citizen.
[Emphasis added].
The above-stated rule has been specifically recognized and enunciated as being the law in the State of
Utah by this Court.

In Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v.

State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 421, 426, 347 P.2d 179,
182 (1959), this Court stated as follows:
In harmony with the above is the well
recognized rule that in case of ambiguity,
uncertainty or doubt, taxing statutes
are construed liberally in favor of the
taxpayer and strictly against the
taxing authority.
See also Pacific Intermountain Express

CO:- v. State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 2d
144, 329 P.2d 650 (1958); and Ogden Union
Railway and Depot Company v. State Tax
commission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964).
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Thus, if there is any doubt whatsoever that the
meaning of the words "must" and "shall" as utilized by
the Utah Legislature in Utah Code Annotated §§59-9-6.3,
59-9-8, and 17-36-31, supra, have a directory or mandatory meaning, they are to be constructed as mandatory. 1
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule that if
taxes are not levied as per statutory directive those
taxes cannot be imposed.

This rule has been stated by

one authority as follows:
The time for making
most jurisdictions,
statute or charter.
vision is directory
authorities may not
provision as to the
the levy • • • •

the levy is, in
prescribed by
Unless such promerely, the taxin~
time for making of

16 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations,
§44.95 at p.270, [Emphasis added]
The Florida Supreme Court has directly dealt with
the issue of whether or not a tax imposed after a statutory deadline is legal and lawful.

In Headley v. State

ex rel Walker, 51 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1951) the City of

1

See also 16 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, §44.13,
pp. 40-41 and 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §66.01,
p. 179, (D. Sans Ed., 4th Ed. 1974), wherein it is stated:
[I]t is a settled rule that tax laws are. to be
strictly construed against the state and in favor
of the taxpayer. When there is reasonable doubt
as to the meaning of a revenue statute, the doubt
is to be resolved in favor of those taxed. This
has been called a 'fundamental precept'.
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Miami had during July prepared its budget, part of which
was based on the amounts anticipated to be receivable
based upon business license fees.

Walker was assessed

a license fee of $73.80 which he paid.

The statute in

question required the city to pass its appropriations
not later than August 1 in any given year.

On September

7, the city enacted an ordinance which raised the amount
on occupational licenses to $280.00.

Walker was arrested

for not paying the newly imposed occupational tax.

The

Florida Supreme Court held that the city could not
impose a higher tax for the year in question, stating as
follows:
If the City of Miami under the guise of
an emergency ordinance, has the power
to levy an additional occupational tax
against the petitioner's business after
the general appropriation ordinance was
enacted and the prescribed amount
promptly paid, then what limitation of
power, if any, would preclude the
enactment of other and additional
ordinances within the fiscal year?
Such unrestrained taxing power by the
city could destroy petitioner-appellee's
dry cleaning business. The power of
the city to further tax the dry cleaning
business was exhausted when the appropriation ordinance was enacted. . . .
Id., 51 So.2d at p.39.
This precise issue was also addressed by the Illinois
Supreme Court in People ex rel Ward v. Chicago & E. I.
Ry. co., 365 Illinois 202, 6 N.E.2d 119 (1936).

In that

case the local Board of Supervisors held a meeting on
December 12, 1934, in which they levied the county tax.
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The specific statutory provision in question required the
Board of Supervisors to hold an annual meeting on the
second Tuesday of September at which the amount of tax
to be raised was to be determined.

The question presented

was whether the Board of Supervisors had, on December 12th,
the jurisdiction to levy the challenged tax.

The Illinois

Supreme Court held as follows:
It requires no citation of authorities to
sustain the statement that the power to
tax is one laden with great responsibilities and the exercise of such power
should be strictly construed. Where
the statute fixes a period withI'Il'Which
or a day on which the tax is to be levied,
time is of the essence of the power to levy
and the command of the statute in that
respect is mandatory.
Id., 6 N.E.2d at 121 [Emphasis added].
The County levied 1.58 mills of its general property
tax after that date prescribed by Utah statute for such
levy.

Therefore, that levy is null, void, and of no

force and effect and the Trial Court was correct in
granting Kennecott's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
with respect to its First Cause of Action.

POINT III
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 59-11-7,
1953 AS AMENDED, DOES NOT APPLY TO
THE LEVY OF A TAX AND DOES NOT CURE
THE COUNTY'S DEFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 20,
1976 TAX LEVY.
The County contends that Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7,
1953 as amended, is a general provision which cures any
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irregularities accomplished by the County in the levying
of its tax on September 20, 1976.

As Kennecott will

show hereinbelow, that position is in error.
Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, 1953 as amended,
reads in full as follows:
No assessment or act relating to assessment or collection of taxes is illegal
on account of informality or because
the same was not completed within the
time required by law.
The above-cited Utah statutory provision, by its
own terms, applies only to the assessment or collection
of taxes, and not to the levying of a tax.

The County's

action which is here challenged by Kennecott is the
attempted levy of a general ad valorem property tax by
the

Count~

on September 20, 1976, a date later than that

prescribed for any such levy by the Utah Legislature.
The levy of a tax by any taxing authority is not the
assessment or collection, or an act relating to the
assessment or collection, of taxes and hence the statute
above relied upon QY the County is inapplicable and has
no curative effect in this situation.
Those statutes relating to the assessment, levy
and collection of taxes in Title 59, Utah Code Annnotated,
1953 as amended, treat such as follows:
(1) Assessment of Taxes; Title 59, Chapter 5.
(2) Levies; Title 59, Chapter 9.
(3) Collection of Taxes; Title 59, Chapter 10.
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In 16 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, §44.92
pp. 264-65, the distinction between the levy, collection
and assessment of a tax is clearly pointed out as follows:
[Al succinct definition of a tax levy
is that it 'is the formal vote or
action of the body authorized to make
the levy.'
It has been defined as 'the
formal and official action of a legislative body determining and declaring
that a tax of a certain amount, or of a
certain percentage on value, shall be
imposed on persons and properties
subject thereto.'
To levy a tax is to
determine by vote the amount of taxes
to be raised. . . .

Levy by the proper Legislative authority
has been declared to be the first step in
taxation and to be an essential jurisdictional step, and consistent with this pronouncement, no tax can be assessed or
collected unless and until a levy is
ordered by the proper authority.
Levy and assessment are distinct processes, and, except where otherwise
provided by statute, both are essential
to taxation.
[Emphasis added] .
This rule, supra, was well stated in Breckenridge v.
County School Board, 146 Va. 1, 5, 135 S.E. 693, 695
(1926), as follows:
There is a marked difference between
making a levy and the assessment of
property for the purpose of taxation.
A levy is merely fixing the subject and
the amount on which the property is to
be taxed. An assessment consists of
listing the property and putting a
value thereon to which the rate fixed
by the levy is to be applied.
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Furthermore, as was stated by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Lynch v. Howell, 165 Nebraska 525, 86 N.W.2d
364, 365-66 (1957), as follows:
The purpose of an assessment is to
determine the ownership, quantity, and
value of property for tax purposes as of
the date fixed by statute, . • . . It
involves no question of the power tO-tax
. . . . [Citation deleted). The property
is taxed by the city when the city
levies the tax.

An assessment is an official listing of
owners and quantities of property with
an estimate of the value of the property
of each for the purpose of taxation on a
day fixed by the Legislature . . . .
[Citation deleted). The assessment of
property does not involve the power to
tax. The question of the power to tax
arises at the time the levy of the tax
is made.
[Emphasis added) .
Additionally, as has been stated by the Oregon
Supreme Court in Oregon Worsted Company v. Chambers,
217 Ore. 104, 342 P.2d 108, 114 (1959):
The levy of a tax by the tax levying
body and the process of its assessment
and collection are separate and distinct
functions in the total process of
taxation.
And finally, as has been stated by the Washington
Supreme Court in Carkonen v. Williams, 76 Wash. 2d 617,
458 P • 2d 280 t

286 (1969):

The word ,·levy' when used in connection
with the authority to tax, while assuming other meanings through interchangeable
or indiscriminate usage, strictly speaking
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denotes the exercise of a legislative
function, whether state or local, which
determines that a tax shall be imposed,
and fixes the amount, purpose, and subject
of the action.
Thus, to "levy" a tax is to declare that tax, fix
the amount of same and ascertain what is to be taxed.
"Assessment" is to determine the value of what is to be
taxed to which a levy is to apply.

"Collection" is the

process of crediting to the taxing authority those
revenues derived by applying a levy to an assessment.
Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, supra, addresses
itself to the collection and assessment of taxes, but
not to the levy of same.

If the Utah Legislature had

intended that statute's provisions to apply to the levy
of taxes, it could have easily so stated.
Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, does not cure an
improper levy of a tax.

Therefore, in light of the

principles above stated that the "power to tax must be
drawn from express statutory authority", emphasis
added, that there is no such thing as taxation by
implication", and that "[a]ll doubts must be resolved
against the taxing authority," and because the Legislature did not expressly declare the curative effects
of Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, supra, to apply to
"levies" its provisions do not cure the County's
defective levy.
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CONCLUSION

As has been clearly shown from the foregoing the
ad valorem general property tax mill levy by the County
on September 20, 1976 of 16 mills is illegal and uncollectible.

Only the general property tax mill levy

by the County accomplished on August 9, 1976 of 14.42
mills is valid and collectible and the Trial Court was
correct and should be sustained in its granting to
Kennecott Partial Summary Judgment in this action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~~'day

of September,

1977.

of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No. (801) 532-1234

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-29-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I personally delivered two
(2) true and accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT to R. Paul Van Darn, Salt Lake
County Attorney, City & County Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111; and to Bill Thomas Peters, Special
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, 400 Chancellor Building,
220 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; this
~day

of September, 1977 •

. •,'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-30-by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

